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METROMEDIA, INC. V CITY OF SAN DIEGo: A FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTAL
SUPPRESSION OF SPEECH
INTRODUCTION

On March 14, 1972, the San Diego City Council adopted an ordinance
which substantially prohibited the erection of off-site "outdoor advertising
2
display signs" within the city. 1 In addition to on-site commercial signs the
ordinance permitted government signs, bench signs, commemorative plaques, religious symbols, signs within shopping centers not visible beyond the
premises, real estate signs, public service signs depicting time, temperature or
news, signs on vehicles, and temporary off-premises subdivision directional
signs. 3 The city council later amended the ordinance to exempt "temporary
political campaign signs." 4 The declared purposes of the ordinance included
the intent "to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought about
by distracting sign displays" and to "preserve and improve the appearance
of the city." 5
6
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City ofSan Diego, the plaintiffs were engaged in the
outdoor advertising business in San Diego. They challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance and sued to enjoin its enforcement. The trial court
7
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Ap8
peals, Fourth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court. The California
holding that the ordinance did not violate first
Supreme Court reversed,
9
amendment guarantees.
°
The United States Supreme Court reversed' in a decision that was unable to muster a majority in support of a single rationale. The ordinance
was declared unconstitutional on its face due to its impermissible restrictions
on noncommercial speech.
This comment will examine the different approaches the Supreme
Court has developed to assess the constitutionality of governmental suppression of both commercial and noncommercial speech. An analysis of the ways
in which these approaches were applied in Metromedia will follow. The com1. SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.0700(B) (1972). Off-site signs are those that do not
identify a use, facility, or service located on the premises or a product that is produced, sold, or
manufactured on the premises. San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10,795 (Mar. 14, 1972).
2. On-site signs are defined as those "designating the name of the owner or occupant of
the premises upon which signs are placed, or identifying such premises; or signs advertising
goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which such signs
are placed." SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.0700 (1972).

Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10,795 (Mar. 14, 1972).
Diego, Cal., Ordinance 12,189 (Oct. 19, 1977).
DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.0700(A) (1972).
U.S. 490 (1981).
Id.at 497.
8. Id.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

San
San
SAN
453

9. 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
10. 453 U.S. at 521.
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ment will conclude with an examination of the inherent difficulties in these
approaches and a look at the way the Court would analyze a case in which a
total prohibition of billboard advertising is presented.
I.

A.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL SUPPRESSION OF SPEECH

Regulation Based on the Time, Place, or Manner of Speech

The first amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate at
all times, places, or in any manner.I' The Supreme Court has held that the
first amendment allows reasonable regulations of constitutionally protected
speech where necessary to further significant governmental interests.' 2 The
essence of these regulations lies in the recognition that various methods of
speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate legitimate government
goals.' 3 "The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a partic14
ular time."'
The Court established three criteria for reviewing such regulations in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.' 5 Restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech are permissible provided that
the ordinance is content-neutral, serves a significant government interest,
and leaves open adequate alternative channels of communication. 16 In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission ' I the Court allowed a public
utility company to include inserts discussing controversial issues of public
policy in its monthly bills. The Court reaffirmed its position that a valid
time, place, and manner restriction "may not be based either upon the content or subject matter of the speech."' 8
The most recent application of the time, place, and manner restriction
occurred in Heffon v. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. '9 The
Court determined that a state may require a religious organization desiring
to distribute religious literature at a state fair to conduct those activities only
at an assigned location, even though this limited the religious practices of the
organization.
B.

Regulation of Speech Based on Content
A regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech may be imposed so

11. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). See
infra text accompanying note 19.
12. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 64 n. 18. See infra text accompanying notes 32-34.
13. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980). See also
Erzonoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), where the Court stated that in order to
survive a constitutional attack such regulations must be narrowly tailored.
14. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
15. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
16. Id. at 771. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), where an antinoise ordinance survived constitutional attack because it was sufficiently tailored and did not
unduly interfere with first amendment rights.
17. 447 U.S. 530-(1980).
18. Id. at 536.
19. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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long as it is reasonable. 20 However, when the regulation is based on the
content of speech, the governmental action must be more carefully scrutinized to ensure that communication has not been prohibited "merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views." ' 21 Governmental
action that regulates speech on the basis of its subject matter "slip[s] from
the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about
22
content.,
In Erznozntk v. City ofJacksonville,23 the Court invalidated an ordinance
prohibiting the exhibition of motion pictures displaying nudity at drive-in
theatres with screens visible from a public street because that the ordinance regulated expression on the basis of content.2 4 In Linmark Associates,
Inc. v.Township of Wi'/ingboro,25 the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting the placement of "for sale" and "sold" signs in front of residential
dwellings. The Court reasoned that the ordinance banned only signs carrying a specific message rather than all signs of a certain size, shape, or location
26
and, therefore, related to the content of speech.
As a general rule "the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." ' 27 However, government regulations based on subject
matter have been approved in narrow circumstances. In Greet v. Spock 2 3 the
Court upheld the prohibition of partisan political speech on a military base
even though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other subjects. 29 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights 30 the plurality permitted a city
transit system that rented space in its vehicles for commercial advertising to
refuse to accept partisan political advertising. 3 1 These are narrow exceptions because both cases involved regulation of speech in government-created forums.
C.

Prohibition of a ParticularMedium of Communication

The distinction between regulation and total prohibition of speech was
recognized in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.32 The Court held that a
zoning ordinance banning adult book stores, movies, and bars did not constitute an invalid prior restraint violative of the first amendment or the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 33 The Court noted that the
ordinance was not a flat prohibition on the operation of adult movie theatres
20. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
21. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (quoting Kalven, The Concept
of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 29).
23. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
24. Id. at 211-12.
25. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
26. Id. at 93-94.
27. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
28. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
29. Id. at 838.
30. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
31. Id. at 302.
32. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
33. Id. at 60.
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within the city and cautioned that "[t]he situation would be quite different if
the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to,
lawful speech."

'34

In Schneider v. Arizona 35 absolute bans on handbill distribution were held
unconstitutional notwithstanding claims of municipalities that the aim of
the legislation was the prevention of littering. InJamisonv. Texas 36 the Court
declared that "[tihe right to distribute handbills concerning religious subjects on the streets may not be prohibited at all times, at all places, and
under all circumstances." '3 7 In Martin v. City ofStruthers3 8 a flat prohibition of
door-to-door solicitation was held unconstitutional. In Kovacs v. Cooper,39 although no opinion commanded a majority of the Court, three members of
the plurality observed that an "[aibsolute prohibition" on sound trucks was
"probably unconstitutional. '"40 Three others concluded their dissent on
grounds that the statute in fact constituted just such "an absolute and un4
qualified prohibition" of sound trucks. '
Most recently, the total prohibition question was addressed in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim .42 In striking down a total ban on live entertain-

ment the Court assessed "the substantiality of the governmental interests asserted" and "whether those interests could be served by means that would be
'43
less intrusive on activity protected by the First Amendment.
D.

Regulation of Commercial and NoncommercialSpeech

The Supreme Court first confronted the problem of determining the
44
first amendment status of commercial speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen.
The Court held that the first amendment does not protect purely commercial speech.4 5 Purely commercial advertisement of goods or services remained outside of first amendment protection until Bigelow v. Virginia.46
The Court concluded that an advertisement which contained factual information pertaining to an issue of public concern outweighed a state's interest
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 71 n.35.
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
318 U.S. 413 (1943).
Id. at 416.
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
336 U.S. 77 (1949).

40. Id. at 81-82.
41. Id. at 101 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
43. Id. at 68-70.
44. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The defendant was convicted of distributing commercial advertising handbills in violation of a local anti-litter ordinance prohibiting commercial leafletting in
the streets. Id. at 53 n.1.
45. The Court determined that the primary purpose of the speech was commercial and
held that addition of a political message on the back of the leaflet would not elevate it to a
constitutionally protected status. Id. at 55. The Court later abandoned the primary purpose
test in favor of a content analysis. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court reversed the conviction of a Virginia newspaper that
had published an advertisement for a New York abortion referral service in violation of a Virginia statute which prohibited ads that encouraged abortion.
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47
in suppressing speech.

Although the Court recognized that the first amendment protects commercial speech, it was quick to point out that commercial speech does not
merit the same degree of protection as noncommercial speech. Speech which
proposed no more than a commercial transaction was entitled to first
amendment protection in Virginia Pharmacy Board. A Virginia statute prohibiting price advertising by pharmacists was held unconstitutional. The Court
recognized, however, that "common-sense differences" between commercial
and other forms of speech "suggest that a different degree of protection is
necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial infor48
mation is unimpaired."
In Bates v. State Bar of Arzona 49 the Court relied on the teachings of
Virgina Pharmacy Board to prevent Arizona from prohibiting truthful and
legitimate price advertisements of legal services and again recognized the
"common-sense differences" between commercial and noncommercial
speech. 50 One year later in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 5 1 the Court
upheld the suspension from practice of an attorney for face-to-face solicitation of business for pecuniary gain. 52 Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
stated that commercial speech was afforded "a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
' 53
Amendment values."
In CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 54 a New
York State Public Service Commission regulation which prevented electric
utilities from advertising the use of electricity was held invalid. The Court
reaffirmed the conclusion reached in Ohralik,5 5 stating that the Constitution
accords "a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression" and added that "[t]he protection available for
particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression
'56
and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.
The Court then adopted a four-part test for determining the validity of
government restrictions based on the content of commercial speech. 57 The
first amendment protects only commercial speech which concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it seeks to implement a substantial governmental
interest, directly advances that interest, and reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. The Commission's regulation was
47. The existence of the New York referral service was considered "not unnewsworthy."
Id. at 822.

425 U.S. at 771 n.24. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Id. at 380-8 1.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
These activities were referred to as "classic examples of 'ambulance chasing.' " 436
469 (Marshall, J., concurring).
436 U.S. at 456.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
See supra text accompanying notes 51-53; see also Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
56. 447 U.S. at 563.
57. Id. at 563-66.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
U.S. at
53.
54.
55.
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overturned, therefore, because the suppression of speech was more extensive
than necessary to further New York's interest in energy conservation.
Finally, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 58 presented the Court with a
situation in which a billboard regulation distinguished between commercial
and noncommercial speech. The ordinance was invalidated because commercial speech was afforded greater protection than noncommercial speech.
II.
A.

METROMEDIA, INC. V CITY OF SAN DIEO

ProceduralHistog

The trial court found the San Diego ordinance to be an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police power and an abridgment of Metromedia's
first amendment rights. 59 The California Court of Appeal affirmed on the
first ground without reaching the first amendment issue. 6°
The California Supreme Court reversed on the ground that a city's interest in either traffic safety or aesthetics justifies exercise of the police
power. 6 1 The ordinance, however, was analyzed only in terms of its effect on
commercial speech. In dismissing the first amendment challenge, the court
relied on the United States Supreme Court's summary dismissals of appeals
62
in three cases upholding billboard regulation ordinances.
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to hear
Metromedia's appeal. 63 The Court was thus presented with its first opportunity to provide guidance for assessing the relation between the first amendment interest of billboard advertisements and a city's interest in traffic safety
and aesthetics.
B.

Metromeda's Position

Metromedia argued that the ordinance was invalid on first and fourteenth amendment grounds because it would result in the total ban of outdoor advertising in San Diego.6 Metromedia pointed out that San Diego
agreed that "many businesses, politicians, and other persons rely upon outdoor advertising because other forms of advertising are insufficient, inappropriate and prohibitively expensive."' 65 The ordinance, Metromedia urged,
would effectively eliminate an entire medium of communication.
58. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
59. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr.
510 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. SetNewman Signs, Inc. v. Hielle, 440 U.S. 901 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising
Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 393 U.S. 316
(1969). These cases were dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
63. 449 U.S. 897 (1980).
64. Brief for Appellants at 18-33, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490

(1981).
65. Id. at 33-45.
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The Holdzng

Five separate opinions were written. Justice White wrote the plurality
opinion in which Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined. The plurality applied the four-part test in CentralHudson and found the ordinance to be
valid insofar as it regulated commercial speech. 66 The ordinance, however,
67
was declared unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Stating that noncommercial speech deserves greater protection than commercial speech, the Court held that the ordinance inverts this rule by affording a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial
speech .68
Justice Brennan, writing a concurring opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined, took the position that the practical effect of the ordinance was
to eliminate billboards as an effective medium of communication in San Diego. 69 By applying the Schad test, Justice Brennan found that the city failed
to establish adequate traffic safety and aesthetic justification for a total prohibition of speech. 70 The concurring justices concluded that a city could
totally ban billboards if it showed the ban would further a "sufficiently sub' 71
stantial governmental interest.
The dissenting justices held that an absolute ban on billboard advertising, whether limited to commercial advertising or extending to all messages,
was within the legitimate authority of local governments. However, each
felt the need to write a separate opinion. Chief Justice Burger, citing Hejion,
argued that nothing in the first amendment prevents such a ban. 72 Justice
Stevens relied on Kovacs to reach the same conclusion. 73 Justice Rehnquist
agreed substantially with the views of the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens, 74 adding that aesthetic justification alone was sufficient to sustain a
75
total billboard ban.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE

Metromedia presented the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to
assess the relationship between the first amendment interest in billboard advertising and a municipality's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics. 76 The
case also presented the Court with the opportunity to provide some much
needed clarification of the different first amendment protections afforded to
commercial and noncommercial speech. The plurality focused on the latter
question while the rest of the Court focused on the former. The result was
66. 453 U.S. at 512. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
67. Id. at 521.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 525-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 528. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 566 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 19.
73. Id. at. 550-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 39-4 1.
74. Id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 570. See also
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
76. See Aronovsky, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego: Aesthetzs, the Fst Amendment,
and the Realities of Billboard Control, 9 EcoLOGY L. Q. 295-339 (1981).
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that neither issue received consideration by the entire Court. As Justice
Rehnquist concluded, "it is a genuine misfortune to have the Court's treatment of the subject be a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definite
principles can be clearly drawn. .",77
It was anticipated that the Court in Metromedia would provide guidance
for municipalities contemplating the constitutionality of various billboard
ordinances. Four of the five opinions provided some guidance. Unexpectedly, the case was resolved through an analysis of commercial and noncommercial speech. The precedential holding of Metromedia is that commercial
speech must not be afforded greater first amendment protection than noncommercial speech. This concept is not novel and fits neatly into the line of
commercial speech cases. It is significant, however, that the Court is still
unprepared either to define what speech is "commercial" or "noncommercial" or simply to declare that all truthful speech should be afforded equal
first amendment protection.
The more important aspect of this case is that it presents a good illustration of the difficulties and inconsistencies which have resulted from the
evolution of four different methods of analyzing the single issue of governmental suppression of speech. This discussion examines the way these approaches were applied in Metromedia. While it agrees with the plurality's
analysis and with its determination that the constitutionality of a total ban
on billboards was not presented in this case, it looks at the way in which the
entire Court might analyze such a case if it arises.
A.

Analysis of the Ordinance as a Distinction Between Commercial and
Noncommercial Speech

The plurality noted that the Court has "consistently distinguished between the constitutional protection afforded commercial as opposed to noncommercial speech," 78 and separately considered the impact of the
ordinance on both types of speech. The ordinance was found to be valid
insofar as it regulated commercial speech. However, the ordinance was declared invalid under this analysis because commercial speech was permitted
in situations where noncommercial speech was prohibited.
The CentralHudson test was applied to determine the constitutionality of
the regulation on commercial speech.7 9 The plurality recognized that traffic
safety and the appearance of the city are "substantial governmental goals" 80
and agreed with the "accumulated, common-sense judgments of local
lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts" 8 ' that elimination of bill-.
boards reasonably relates to traffic safety. The ordinance was found to go no
further than necessary to accomplish the city's objectives. The regulation of
commercial speech was thus held to satisfy the requirements of Central
77. 453 U.S. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. 453 U.S. at 504-05.

79. Id. at 507. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
80. Id. at 507-08.

81. Id. at 509.
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Hudson .82
The San Diego ordinance permitted an owner of a commercial establishment to erect a billboard only on his own property and only if that billboard advertised goods or services available on that property. The plurality
observed that the effect of this ordinance was to permit commercial speech
while prohibiting noncommercial speech. The plurality recalled the development of the law establishing that while commercial speech deserves first
amendment protection, it does not merit the same degree of protection as
that afforded noncommercial speech. 8 3 The plurality argued that the ordinance results in an inversion of this law by providing greater protection for
commercial speech than for noncommercial speech. 84 The plurality thus determined that the ordinance was unconstitutional, stating "that by allowing
commercial establishments to use billboards to advertise the products and
services they offer, the city necessarily has conceded that some communicative interests, e.g., onsite commercial advertising, are stronger than its com'
peting interests in aesthetics and traffic safety. "85
It appears, therefore, that the plurality would uphold the constitutionality of an ordinance which bans commercial speech while allowing noncommercal speech. Justice Brennan, however, recognized that such an
ordinance will continue to raise significant first amendment problems. An
unacceptable amount of discretion would be left in the hands of city officials
to determine whether a proposed message should be labeled commercial or
noncommercial. Justice Brennan posed the question, "[m]ay the city decide
that a United Automobile Workers billboard with the message 'Be a patriot-do not buy Japanese-manufactured cars' is 'commercial' and there86
fore forbid it? What if the same sign is placed by Chrysler?"
Although Justice Brennan raised good questions, he did not offer any
guidance in distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech.
Neither did the plurality, even though it relied upon this distinction to invalidate the ordinance. Metromedia provided an opportunity to clarify the status
of commercial speech within the hierarchy of first amendment values. The
Court, however, avoided this issue. In Central Hudson Justice Rehnquist
stated that "the Court unlocked a Pandora's Box ' 87 when, in Virginia Pharmacy Board, it recognized different degrees of first amendment protection for
commercial and noncommercial speech. Until the Court either defines its
terms or declares all truthful communication, commercial and noncommercial, worthy of equal first amendment protection, "Pandora's Box" will remain open.

B.

Analysts of the Ordinanceas a Content-BasedRegulation
The plurality recognized that the exceptions to the ordinance's general
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 512.
Id. at 504-08.
Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 539 (Brennan, J., concurring).
447 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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prohibition of billboards distinguishes between permissible and impermissible signs by reference to content.8 8 The plurality, however, avoided performing a content analysis. Perhaps this is because it had already decided
the case under a commercial/noncommercial speech analysis and wanted to
ensure that its holding would not be clouded by a separate analysis. Or
perhaps it was to avoid a discussion concerning whether the exceptions
themselves are constitutional. The plurality did point out, however, that
these content-based exceptions preclude the use of a time, place, and manner
analysis.8 9
Justice Stevens stated that "the plurality focuses its attention on the
exceptions from the total ban and, somewhat ironically, concludes that the
ordinance is an unconstitutional abridgment of speech because it does not
abridge enough speech."0 This is simply an inaccurate account of the plurality's treatment of the case. The plurality did not focus its attention on
these exceptions. It clearly performed an entirely different analysis.
C. Analysis of the Ordinance as a Time, Place, or Manner Regulation
Rather than participate in the plurality's discussion of the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech, the remainder of the Court
treated the case as a straightforward competition between the first amendment values of billboard advertising and a municipality's interest in traffic
safety and aesthetics. In assessing this relationship, the justices were divided
over whether the ordinance should be classified as a time, place, or manner
regulation or as a total prohibition of a medium of communication. The
classification is vital because it determines the analysis to be used.
Chief Justice Burger stated that "[iut is not really relevant" 9 ' how the
ordinance is classified. He argued that the Court should not simply select a
classification and apply its corresponding analysis. However, as the plurality
pointed out, "[t]hese 'labels' or 'categories' . . . have played an important
role in this Court's analysis of First Amendment problems in the past. The
standard THE CHIEF JUSTICE himself adopts appears to be based almost
92
exclusively on prior discussions of time, place and manner restrictions."
The Chief Justice addressed the basic question of whether a city may
exercise its police power to eliminate billboards in the interests of traffic
safety and aesthetics. 93 In answering in the affirmative, Chief Justice Burger
relied on the time, place, and manner analysis in Heffon.94 He concluded
that traffic safety and aesthetics are legitimate governmental interests and
that billboards frustrate those interests. 95 The Chief Justice contended that
the exceptions to the general prohibition are content-neutral. He stated that
the city "has not preferred any viewpoint and, aside from these limited ex88. 453 U.S. at 516.
89. Id. at 517.
90. Id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 556 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
92. 453 U.S. at 518 n.23.
93. Id. at 557 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 566. See supra text accompanying note 19.

95. Id. at 565.
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ceptions, has not allowed some subjects while forbidding others."
There are two flaws with Chief Justice Burger's choice of the time,
place, and manner analysis. First, while the intent of the legislators may not
have been to favor certain subject matter over others, the result of the exceptions is such a discrimination. For example, certain religious symbols would
be permitted while other symbols, not recognized as "religious" would be
prohibited. The time, place, and manner cases hold that the effect of the
97
The
legislation may determine whether a regulation is content-neutral.
effect of the exception is discrimination based on content. This removes the
ordinance from a time, place, and manner analysis.
The second flaw in the analysis is that it neglects the requirement of
Virginia Pharmacy Board that alternative channels of communication remain
open. As the parties stipulated, however, adequate alternate means of communication do not exist. 98 Whether or not Chief Justice Burger approves of
the concept of these classifications, it is difficult to believe that Heffon may
be legitimately applied in this case.
D. Analysis of the Ordinance as a Total Prohbtition of Speech
Perhaps it is because "every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition," 99 or that Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens were simply anxious to express their views on the subject, that they treated the case as
presenting the total ban question. Justice Brennan argued that the exceptions to the ordinance do not alter the nature of the ban, the "practical effect" of which eliminates billboards as an effective medium of
communication. 100 Despite their good intentions of wanting to provide guidance in these matters, it seems that these justices prematurely performed
the total ban analysis. A genuine, as opposed to a practical, total ban situation is likely to arise eventually.
Classification of Metromedia as a total ban question is inappropriate for
two reasons. First, the exceptions to the general ban are significant and substantial. By their very nature these exceptions should remove the ordinance
from this analysis. Second, the justices who applied this analysis mistakenly
equated the total elimination of a particular business with the total elimina10
tion of a particular medium of communication. 1 The fact that the outdoor
advertising business in San Diego is eliminated does not necessarily mean
that billboards are also eliminated. Billboards may exist independently of
the advertising business.
Determining whether an ordinance is a prohibition or merely a regula96. Id. at 564.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
98. Joint Stipulation of Facts § 28, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490

(1981).
99. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
100. 453 U.S. at 525-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
101. "If enforced as written, the ordinance at issue in this case will eliminate the outdoor
advertising business in the City of San Diego. The principal question presented is, therefore,
whether a city may prohibit this medium of communication." Id. at 540 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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tion is at least as difficult as determining whether an ordinance is contentbased. In Kovacs the question presented was whether an ordinance which
regulated the use of "loud and raucous" sound trucks was, in fact, a regulation or a'total ban. 10 2 Sound trucks are, by their nature, "loud and raucous." In Metromedia Justice Stevens stated that whether the ordinance in
Kovacs was a regulation or a prohibition, it at least permits a city to enforce a
rule that "curtails the effectiveness of a particular means of

communication."

03

1

IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite the plurality's determination in Metromedia that traffic safety
and aesthetics are "substantial governmental goals,' 1 4 it cannot be concluded that the plurality justices would allow either of these interests to uphold a total prohibition of billboard advertising. Justice Brennan argued
that under these circumstances Schad is the appropriate test to apply. The
city would have to prove that "a sufficiently substantial governmental interest is directly furthered by the total ban and that any more narrowly drawn
restriction . . .would promote less well the achievement of that goal."' 0 5
This would impose a much more difficult burden of proof on the city than it
faced under the Central Hudson test which was applied only to determine the
validity of restrictions on commercial speech. The "common-sense judgment" of a legislature which satisfied Central Hudson will not satisfy Schad.
If the city's interest in the ordinance is either traffic safety or aesthetics,
Schad would require the city to prove that billboards actually do adversely
affect traffic safety or to demonstrate that its interest in the aesthetics of
industrial areas is sufficiently substantial to justify a total ban. These stan0 6
dards of proof would be extremely difficult to meet.1
If a case arises in which the total ban is unquestionably presefited, there
is little reason to believe that all of the justices will analyze the ordinance
within the Schad framework. Justice Brennan is correct in his belief that the
Schad test should be applied. Kovacs should not apply because it was questionable whether that ordinance constituted a regulation or a prohibition.
The justices clearly pointed out that if the ordinance resulted in an absolute
102. 338 U.S. at 78.
103. 453 U.S. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "If the First Amendment categorically protected the marketplace of ideas from any quantitative restraint, a municipality could not outlaw
graffiti." Id.
104. 453 U.S. at 507-08.
105. Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring).
106. The considerations of public safety and beauty as proffered by the state as a basis
for prohibiting the speech signified by the [billboards] are mutually inconsistent. The
argument is made that our'residents are entitled to look at the beauty of the countryside, untrammeled by the blight of billboards, in the face of the statement that billboards can be banned because they constitute a distraction to the drivers of
automobiles. Using this reasoning, one could argue the countryside should be covered
with billboards to reduce the temptation to avert one's eyes from the road.
Brief for Appellants at 41, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (quoting
denied, 446
Oklahoma ex. ret Dep't of Transp. v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337, 342-43 (Okla. 1979), cert.
U.S. 980 (1982)).
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ban they would have reached a different conclusion by applying a more
strict set of requirements.
Even if Justice Stevens does not apply Kovacs he still seems willing to
conclude that a city's interests in traffic safety and aesthetics are legitimate
governmental goals which are sufficient to justify the ban.1 0 7 Justice Rehnquist will uphold the total ban solely on the basis of the city's desire to enhance its own beauty. 10 8 Chief Justice Burger, believing that it makes no
difference how the ordinance is classified, will continue to hold that the city
has the right to impose a total ban. 10 9
The plurality would not indicate whether it would uphold a total
ban." 0 The element of uncertainty in assessing whether the Court would
uphold the prohibition is in determining the approaches which these justices
are likely to take. If three justices follow the Schad test, or any of the other
cases within that total prohibition category, the ordinance would most likely
be invalidated because the city would probably not be able to meet such a
heavy burden of proof. If two justices choose not to be restrained by the
classification and to apply some less strict standard of review such as those
chosen by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, the ordinance would
probably be upheld.
Ironically then, the element of uncertainty rests with the same justices
who decided the Supreme Court's first billboard regulation case. 1 ' Metromedia is a good example of "the often unpredictable variety of response
and lack of finality of resolution that the recurring tensions between speech
' 12
and law in a free society are capable of producing." "
Eugene Burton Elliot

107. "[A] wholly impartial total ban on billboards would be permissible...." 453 U.S. at
553 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
108. "[T]he aesthetic justification alone is sufficient to sustain a total prohibition of billboards within a community .... 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954)).
109. "San Diego simply is exercising its police power to provide an environment of tranquility, safety, and as much residual beauty as a modern metropolitan area can achieve." 453 U.S.
at 566 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
110. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20. Justice Stewart has since retired from the Court.
11l.At the time of this writing the City of San Diego was in the process of re-evaluating its
billboard regulation. The City was unable at that time to venture a guess as to whether a total
billboard prohibition would be declared valid. Telephone interview with C. Alan Sumption,
Deputy City Attorney for the City of San Diego (Jan. 8, 1982).
112.

F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 480 (1981).

